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THE OBSCENITY DEFENSE TO COPYRIGHT
REVISITED*
INTRODUCTION
In the past, courts and commentators alike have generally
presumed, without substantial question, that works of an ob-
scene or immoral nature are beyond the purview of the pro-
tection afforded by copyright law.1 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, however, recently dealt a serious blow to the
vitality of that presumption in Mitchell Brothers Film Group
v. Cinema Adult Theater. In reversing the district court's
finding that the movie involved in Mitchell Brothers was ob-
scene and therefore unworthy of protection,3 the court of ap-
peals held that the copyright statute does not except obscene
works from protection,4 that the Constitution does not require
such an exception,5 and that no doctrine of judicial creation
* This comment, at an earlier stage in its development, was awarded First Prize
in the 1980 Nathan Burkson Memorial Competition at the University of Kentucky
College of Law. The competition is sponsored by the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers.
I See generally A. LATmA, HowLL's COPYRIGHT LAW 45 (4th ed. 1963); 1 M.
NIMMER, ON COPYRIGHT 2-193 (1979); Rogers, Copyright and Morals, 18 MICH. L.
REv. 390 (1920); Note, Immorality, Obscenity, and the Law of Copyright, 6 S.D. L.
REV. 110 (1961); Comment, Copyright-The Obscenity Defense in Actions to Protect
Copyright, 46 FoRDHAM L. Rv. 1037 (1978); Comment, Constitutional Protection of
Obscene Material Against Censorship as Correlated with Copyright Protection of
Obscene Material Against Infringement, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 301 (1958). But see
Schneider, Authority of the Register of Copyrights to Deny a Claim to Copyright on
the Ground of Obscenity, 51 CHI.-KRNT L. REv. 691 (1975).
2 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). The Mitchell
Brothers case involved a movie registered with the United States Copyright Office in
1973. Mitchell Brothers was granted the exclusive right to exhibit and distribute the
work, which it proceeded to do in New York. The operator of Cinema Adult Theatres
obtained several copies of the work and screened it in Dallas, Texas, where the litiga-
tion arose.
3 The district court found the movie, Behind the Green Door, to be obscene,
even though no expert testimony was heard on the issue, and held that the finding
precluded copyright protection. The movie was described by the trial judge as fol-
lows: "the dominant theme of the movie is the portrayal of various sexual acts by a
female person with a multitude of persons, both male and female. The movie portrays
the genital parts of both sexes, acts of fellatio and cunnilingus, and seminal fluid."
192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 140 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
4 604 F.2d at 854-58.
5 Id. at 858-60.
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bars the granting of relief to the holder of a copyright whose
obscene work has been infringed.6
This radical departure from preexisting law necessitates a
reevaluation of the obscenity defense to copyright infringe-
ment actions. At the outset it should be noted that the issue is
not whether obscene material is good or evil;7 rather, assum-
ing such material to be evil, the question becomes whether the
fact that a particular work is obscene is relevant to its treat-
ment under copyright law. This comment will explore further
the issues treated in Mitchell Brothers and will demonstrate
that the rule of that case should be adopted by other courts
because (1) the modern legal view of obscenity renders the de-
fense incompatible with the purpose of copyright law, (2) the
defense was erroneously established from the start, and (3)
the encouragement of obscenity is one paradoxical result of
the obscenity defense to copyright infringement actions. The
rational starting point for such an inquiry is the historical ori-
gin of the obscenity defense in an action for infringement of
copyright.
I. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE DOCTRINE
The obscenity defense to copyright infringement actions
originated in England,8 and the first American case to con-
sider the question was Martinetti v. Maguire.9 The plaintiff in
Martinetti asserted that the defendants' play, The Black
Rook, infringed on his copyright to a play entitled The Black
Crook. The court had no difficulty in finding the former to be
essentially an imitation of the latter but still denied the re-
quested temporary injunction. The court seized upon the stat-
utory language "dramatic composition" and "suited for public
6 Id. at 861-65.
The controversy concerning the regulation of obscenity is another subject
within itself, and an analysis of the issues will not be attempted here. For a general
discussion of the debate, see THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCEN Y AND POR-
NOGRAPHY 37-52 (Stein & Day ed. 1970).
8 For a general discussion of the development of the English rule in this regard,
see E. DRONE, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 185-87 (1879);
Phillips, Copyright in Obscene Works: Some British and American Problems, 6 AN-
GLO. AM. L. REv. 138 (1977); Schneider, supra note 1, at 693-97.
1 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173).
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representation" in finding the plaintiff's work to be outside
the protection of the statute.10 The court was not satisfied
with its statutory solution, however, but continued with a dis-
cussion of the constitutional limits on the power of Congress.
According to the Martinetti court, each work in some way
must promote the progress of the sciences and useful arts
before copyright protection can be extended, and immoral
writing was deemed incapable of promoting such progress.1
10 Id. at 922. There is little reason to believe that the decision was based on other
than statutory grounds. The court commenced its analysis by stating:
On the other hand, if this play is a "dramatic composition," within the
purpose and meaning of the act of congress (4 Stat. 436; 11 Stat. 138), the
motion of the complainants-Maguire et al.-for an injunction against
Martinetti et al. should be allowed. But as at present advised, I do not
think it such a composition. All the witnesses agree-particularly the ex-
perts-that the so-called play of the Black Crook has no originality, and
that it consists almost wholly of scenic effects, or representations taken
substantially from well known dramas and operas.
But further, the act of congress provides that a "dramatic composition"
to be entitled to be copyrighted, must be "suited for public representation."
What is intended by the word "suited?" Simply that the composition is
technically adapted to the stage, and capable of being produced upon it?
While it means this, I am inclined to think it means something more; that
to be suited to public representation, it must be fit to be represented.
Id.
11 The strict construction imposed upon the Constitution by the Martinetti
court is demonstrated by the following.
Hence, it expressly appears that congress is not empowered by the constitu-
tion to pass laws for the protection or benefit of authors and inventors,
except as a means of promoting the progress of "science and useful arts."
. . . So with a dramatic composition which is grossly indecent, and calcu-
lated to corrupt the morals of the people. The exhibition of such a drama
neither "promotes the progress of science or useful arts," but the contrary.
The constitution does not authorize the protection of such productions, and
it is not to be presumed that congress intended to go beyond its power in
this respect to secure their "authors and inventors the exclusive right" to
the use of them. Upon this ground, I very much doubt whether the specta-
cle of the Black Crook is entitled to the benefit of copyright, even if it were
admitted that it was a "dramatic composition."
Id.
In 1898 the use of the words "[s]he's the hottest thing you ever seen" rendered
an otherwise proper song unprotectable, the court relying on Martinetti. Broder v.
Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74, 78 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898). In holding the "immoral"
character of the song to be a defense, the court did not state a basis for its finding
other than citation. Id. at 78-79. It appears that the court placed its primary reliance
on the analysis of Professor Drone. See E. DRONE, supra note 8, at 181-85. In addi-
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The Copyright Act of 190912 substantially changed the
scope of copyright protection afforded. The 1909 Act removed
any suggestion of content-based restriction, stating "that the
works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall
include all the writings of an author."1 3 Despite this altera-
tion, subsequent cases suggesting or holding that a copyright
may not be secured for an obscene work mechanically applied
Martinetti without considering the statutory changes.14
tion to Martinetti, the court referred to two English cases, Lawrence v. Smith, 37
Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch. 1822) (blasphemous work not copyrightable) and Walcot v.
Walker, 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1802) (libelous work not copyrightable). These cases
stand for the proposition that there is no property right in an immoral work. The
court also referred to Shook v. Daly, 49 How. Pr. 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875), presuma-
bly for the proposition that the judiciary serves the role of a conservator of public
morals. No mention of the statute was made, even though it had been amended since
the decision in Martinetti. 16 Stat. 192, 212-16 (1870) (current version at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1-810 (1976)).
The influence of Martinetti also may be found in two federal cases decided in
New York in 1903 and 1913. In Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903), the
court held that a sketch showing quick changes of costume, and consequently por-
tions of human anatomy, could not constitutionally be the basis of a federal copy-
right, citing Martinetti and Broder. In Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375 (N.D.N.Y.
1913), the court noted that "[t]o be entitled to be copyrighted, the composition must
be original, meritorious, and free from illegality or immorality," but the court cited
no authority for this proposition. Id. at 379. But see Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho.
Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
12 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-
810 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as 1909 Act].
11 1909 Act, supra note 12, § 4.
" While several cases have discussed the issue of obscenity under the 1909 Act,
none have decided the issue without considering the question to be one of protecting
the public from its own lack of "morals" or one of equity. See note 17 infra for a
discussion of equity's role in copyright protection. In Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d
116 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), the court found that the play White Cargo infringed the copy-
right to the book entitled Hell's Playground. The latter expressed a view of morality
as a relative concept, demonstrating the point by depicting interracial sex in Africa.
The court acknowledged the existence of the obscenity defense and then stated:
Whatever may be the view of a prudist with respect to Hell's Play-
ground, I think that the book, when judged by the standards of current
literature, should not be held to be unentitled to copyright protection.
In any event, so far as morality is concerned, the play is no improve-
ment upon the book, and for such reason I believe that any doubt as to the
validity of the defense, based upon the alleged immorality of the book,
should be resolved in favor of complainant.
Id. at 124. While the case primarily represents the changing view of the definition of
obscenity, the court's willingness to compare the morality of the two writings is inter-
esting. Arguably, the court viewed the rule as applicable only if the infringing work
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Mitchell Brothers ended this unquestioned adherence to the
Martinetti rule.
11. MODERN VITALITY OF THE DOCTRINE
Although the vitality of the obscenity defense had been
generally accepted prior to Mitchell Brothers, the court in
that case had little difficulty justifying its departure from pre-
cedent. An analysis of the doctrine's theoretical foundation
supports the Fifth Circuit's position and further indicates
that the foundation may not have been as firm as has often
been presumed.
Historically, the obscenity defense has had three doctri-
nal bases: (1) statutory construction, 15 (2) constitutional limi-
tation of congressional power,18 and (3) the common law. 7
was an attempt to "clean up" the obscene work from which it was copied, which
would be consistent with the general application of the equitable maxim of unclean
hands. H. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF Equrry § 26 (2d ed. 1948).
In Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942), the court found
no infringement. By way of an aside, the court quoted the statement in Richardson v.
Miller, 20 F. Cas. 722, 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1877) (No. 11,791), that "[c]ourts of justice
will not lend their aid to protect the authors of immoral works." 47 F. Supp. at 1018.
The court did not discuss the roles of the statute or the Constitution. Another court
found the subject work to have a "libidinous effect." Khan v. Leo Feist, Inc., 70 F.
Supp. 450, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). The court again cited no authority for the existence
of the obscenity defense doctrine, nor was the theoretical basis for the rule an-
nounced. In Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947), the court's holding
was that no infringement had occurred. Id. at 549. The court nonptheless discussed
the morality of the film, which had been previously seized by local officials for inde-
cency. See also Dane v. M.&H. Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963),
involving a common law copyright.
15 See note 10 supra for the Martinetti court's statutory analysis.
16 See note 11 supra for the constitutional basis of the doctrine.
17 See Schneider, supra note 1, at 694-96 for a general discussion of the doctrine
as a common law rule.
A fourth basis may be deduced from a line of cases which invoke the equitable
maxim of unclean hands. The doctrine of unclean hands is applicable to a copyright
infringement action, at least where equitable relief is sought. 3 M. NIMmm, supra
note 1, § 13.09B. The doctrine is generally limited to instances in which the conduct
complained of has a direct bearing on the transaction that forms the basis for the
suit, not on some general wrong or lack of character. See Chafee, Coming into Equity
with Clean Hands, 18 MICH. L. REv. 1065 (1949). This principle is generally borne
out by the cases discussing the doctrine in the context of copyright. Thus a copyright
will not be enforced where the owner has received his rights from the creator who had
breached a contract with the infringing party, giving the latter exclusive rights to the
copyrighted material. T.B. Harms v. Stern, 231 F. 645 (2d Cir. 1948). Wrongful con-
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Each of these doctrinal underpinnings will be examined.
A. Statutory Limitations
1. Statutory History
The original copyright statute as enacted in 1790 was lim-
ited in scope to specifically enumerated types of writings.18
The 1790 Act was modeled after an English statute,"' the
wording of which has been said to be responsible for the Mar-
tinetti rule.20 In 1831 the copyright statute was revised and
duct which induces the infringement may preclude equitable relief. Tempo Music,
Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1969); Davis v. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240
F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). But see Big Sky Music v. Todd, 388 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.
Ga. 1974). The principle will apply where the holder of the copyright has falsified
information to the Copyright Office. Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F.
Supp. 609 (D.R.I. 1976); International Biotical Corp. v. Associated Mills, Inc., 239 F.
Supp. 511 (N.D. fI1. 1964). But see Neal v. Glickman, 391 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex.
1975). The commission of fraud on the court may invoke the maxim. Jondora Music
Pub. Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972); Higgins v.
Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The court may likewise consider the motive
for bringing the infringement action in the course of weighing the equities of the
parties. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311-13 (2d
Cir. 1964) (Lunbard, C.J., concurring); Nom Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 227 F. Supp. 922
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). The significant thread running through each of these cases is that in
none was the content of a writing sufficient to invoke the doctrine; each required
some specified conduct that affected the infringement.
In the few cases prior to Mitchell Brothers which raised the doctrine of unclean
hands relative to the content of a work, the ground generally alleged was that the
work was fraudulent. The issue was first raised in Stone & McCarrick v. Dugan Pi-
ano, 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915), wherein the court stated in dictum that a work which
perpetrated a fraud on the public would not be protected in a court of equity. With-
out discussing the doctrine of unclean hands, another court in 1939 issued an injunc-
tion notwithstanding its finding that the work was fraudulent. Deutsch v. Fulton, 27
F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). In 1973 the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow
Stone & McCarrick and enjoined the infringement of a writing which fraudulently
represented that a user could "beat the horses." Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087
(9th Cir. 1973).
The Mitchell Brothers court went well beyond overruling its prior statement in
Stone & McCarrick and strenuously argued against its vitality in the first instance.
604 F.2d at 863-64. Thus, at present, no case can be cited as authority for the pro-
position that the content of a work affects the equities of the parties in an infringe-
ment action.
"I Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810
(1976)).
29 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1709).
20 E. DRONE, supra note 8, at 1. A statute modeled after a prior English statute
brings the English construction with it. Pennock v. Dialogue, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 18
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musical compositions were included within its scope.21 The
1831 Act was amended in 1856 to extend copyright protection
"to the author or proprietor of any dramatic composition,
designed or suited for public representation." 2 The Mar-
tinetti court construed this statute to preclude the protection
of a work which was "immoral." While the construction
placed upon the statute by the Martinetti court was probably
faulty from the start,23 the troublesome question is whether
this construction was later accepted by Congress, becoming by
implication a part of the statute.24
The copyright statutes underwent extensive revision in
1870.25 The statute again enumerated specific types of writ-
ings and qualified those by the phrase "intended to be per-
fected as works of the fine arts. '28 Arguably, this revision in-
corporated the Martinetti rule, in that the term "fine arts" is
considerably more suggestive of a content requirement than
the deleted phrase "designed or suited for public representa-
tion." It is equally plausible, however, that Congress intended
that the author's intent be the controlling factor rather than
whether the work could ultimately be categorized as fine art.
In any event, the Supreme Court did not agree that the
phrase imposed a content-based restriction.27
(1829). The more prevalent view appears to be, however, that the doctrine arises from
the common law. See note 67 infra for a discussion of this point.
21 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 15, 4 Stat. 436 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810
(1976)).
22 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-
810 (1976)).
23 The Martinetti court utilized the phrase "suited to public representation" and
construed "suited" to be synonymous with "fit." See note 10 supra for the court's
analysis. The statute actually read "designed or suited to public representation." Act
of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. Read as a whole, the phrase is indicative of an
intent to define the term "writing," as used in the statute, from the standpoint of the
technology involved. Viewed in this light, the Martinetti holding was erroneous, and
that the court felt it necessary to discuss constitutional limitations lends credence to
the argument that the court strained for its construction of the statute.
24 White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 14 (1907) (view-
ing congressional silence as acquiescence to prior English and American cases on
point).
251 Act of July 8, 1870, cl. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810
(1976)).
26 Id. at 386.
27 Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho. Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Justice Holmes wrote
1980-811
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President Theodore Roosevelt called for extensive copy-
right reform in 1905, s and the resulting 1909 Act differed
from previous statutes by setting forth an all-inclusive grant
of protection" followed by eleven categories specifically desig-
nated as nonexclusive.5 0 The 1909 Act allowed no implication
of a content-based restriction. The enumerated specifications
related to the technique by which the expression occurred
rather than to the relative merit of the expression itself. With
no specified limitation on content, the phrase "all the writ-
ings" would appear to provide a definitive answer to the ques-
tion of scope.31
2. Legislative History
The question is raised, however, by the Act's legislative
history. The final draft of the bill was accompanied by a re-
port3 2 which stated:
Section 4 is declaratory of existing law. It was suggested that
the word "works" should be substituted for the word "writ-
for the Court:
The antithesis to "illustrations or works connected with the fine arts" is not
works of little merit or of humble degree, or illustrations addressed to the
less educated classes .... Certainly works are not the less connected with
the fine arts because their pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore
gives them a real use ....
Id. at 250.
" H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1909) [hereinafter referred to as
1909 Report]. See note 109 infra for Roosevelt's thoughts on the need for copyright
law revision.
9 "[T]he works for which copyright may be secured under this title shall include
all the writings of an author." 1909 Act, supra note 12, § 4.
30 Section 5, after enumerating the 11 classifications of writings, provided "[t]hat
the above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject-matter of copyright as
defined in section four of this Act." Id. § 5.
31 See 604 F.2d at 860. Section 5 was enacted for the convenience of the Copy-
right Office and was not intended to modify § 4. 1909 Report, supra note 28, 10.
However, § 4 must be read in light of prior decisions construing the term "writings"
under former statutes, and for that reason the statutory use of the term "writings" is
thought to be less inclusive than its counterpart in the Constitution. SENATE COMMT-
TEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION 74-75 (1960).
Once it is determined that the work in question is a writing within the meaning of the
statute, the statute provides that all such writings shall benefit from copyright pro-
tection. 1909 Act, supra note 12, § 4.
11 1909 Report, supra note 28.
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ings," but it was thought better to use the word found in the
Constitution. It is not intended by the use of this word to
change in any way the construction which the courts have
given it.33
This statement raises the question whether Congress agreed
with the cases raising obscenity as a defense. The most ra-
tional response is that the quoted statement refers to only
that decisional law relevant to the context in which the state-
ment was made."' Such an analysis would preclude the argu-
ment that Congress intended that the obscenity defense im-
plicitly be a part of the statutory scheme.35 The most that can
be said is that Congress did not consider the matter. There is
no mention of Martinetti or its progeny in the report, and
Congress appears to have been concerned primarily with de-
fining the term "writings."3 " Thus the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Mitchell Brothers that there exists no statutory exception
based on the morality of the work is justifiable, even if not
compelled.
The Copyright Act of 1976 3 provides even less justifica-
tion for an obscenity defense in that the legislative history
specifically precludes consideration of the esthetic value of a
particular work" and the statute itself contains all-inclusive
3 Id. at 10.
34 See A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 16-21.
3 The Mitchell Brothers court noted that the use of the word "all" did not con-
stitute silence on this point but was an affirmative statement that content was imma-
terial to the existence of copyright. 604 F.2d at 854. This position is supported by
statements in the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 to the effect that
esthetic merit is not a consideration. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664. Significantly, the lan-
guage used refers to the absence of content requirements as the status quo and does
not purport to change the standard. Thus, even though the 1909 Report fails to men-
tion this issue, Congress in 1976 did not consider content to be a factor under the
1909 Act. See H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. 42 (1966).
36 See SENATE CoMMrrrE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT
LAw REviSION 73-83 (1960).
37 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as 1976 Act].
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664. Interestingly, the lack of serious literary, artistic, sci-
entific or political value is necessary to find a work obscene in the context of criminal
statutes. See text accompanying note 97 infra for a discussion of the test. Thus, de-
termining the moral nature of a work requires a consideration of factors which are
specifically stated to be immaterial. This fact in and of itself adds great weight to the
1980-81]
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terminology, as did the 1909 Act.3 9 Even if the statutory lan-
guage and the corresponding history is not dispositive of the
issue, an examination of analogous statutory enactments sup-
ports the view that Congress has never intended copyright law
to have a censorship function.
3. Analogous Statutory Enactments
Morality is interposed over two other statutory schemes
that are to some degree related to copyright law. Both trade-
mark law4° and patent law" grant a limited legal monopoly to
achieve a particular end. An examination of the role of moral-
ity in these two areas suggests several possible reasons for the
absence of moral undertones in copyright law and explains
Congress' failure to legislate expressly on the question.
a. Trademark Law
Congress has specifically provided that a trademark
which is obscene or immoral may not be registered. 42 At com-
theory that the statute precludes the obscenity defense after 1976. See note 35 supra
for a discussion of the proposition that this constitutes no change from prior law.
11 The 1976 Act substitutes the word "works" for the term "writings" found in
the 1909 Act so as to avoid the need for a judicial determination of the constitutional
limitations on the term "writing" as found in the Constitution. H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONO. & AD. N.ws 5659, 5664.
4 Langham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-150 (1976). For an excellent treatment of the
subject, see J. McCARTHY, TRADnMARcs & UNFAM COMMTrION (1973).
"' Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976). For a general treatment of pat-
ent law, see 1 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS (2d ed. 1964).
42 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1976) precludes registration of any mark which
"[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter." The effect of
this statute is at best uncertain. While nothing immoral was found in the mark "Li-
bido" on perfume, Ex parte Parfum L'Orle, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (Comm. Pat.
1952), or the title "Week-end Sex" on a magazine, In re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
334 (T.M.T. & App. Bd. 1973), the mark "Bubby Trap" for brassieres was denied
registration on the grounds that the authors of Webster's dictionary considered
"bubby" a vulgar term for a woman's breast. In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443
(T.M.T. & App. Bd. 1971). Professor McCarthy expressed his opinion of the latter
case as follows:
These nineteenth century criteria for acceptable drawing room etiquette
appear curiously out of place in twentieth century advertising media, where
the female anatomy and sexual double-entendre often are used to sell
goods. It is hoped that the brassiere symbolized by the mark BUBBY
TRAP lends more support to its users than the reasoning of the Trademark
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mon law, an immoral or obscene trademark also was denied
protection.43 Congress felt it necessary to expressly except ob-
scene trademarks even though the common law was in accord.
This specific exception suggests that the same would have
been done with copyright law had Congress felt it desirable."
Moreover, the two statutes' different functions serve to ex-
plain the absence of a statutory defense of obscenity in copy-
right infringement actions.45 The law of copyright seeks to en-
courage the expression of ideas, while trademark law serves to
protect the public in its utilization of the marketplace as well
as to protect the entrepreneur's investment in a particular
mark.46 Thus, there is less room for the fear that censorship
will defeat the purpose of trademark legislation than there is
in the case of copyright.47
Board supports its moral judgments. Given the present vague state of the
law of obscenity, it is difficult to conceive of many marks which could val-
idly be rejected as being "immoral." Perhaps the use of the word "immoral"
itself renders that ground void for vagueness.
J. McCARTHY, supra note 41, at § 19.28. The resulting burden on the Patent and
Trademark Office as well as on the entrepreneur is clear, and while the burden may
be tolerable in the case of trademark registration, the effects on copyright may be
considerably more serious. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 718-21.
4 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 726 (1938).
44 That Congress felt it necessary to specify the role of obscenity in trademark
registration indicates that the same would have been done with copyright had Con-
gress thought the defense appropriate. This is particularly true since Congress could
have left it to the courts simply not to enforce the trademark. See note 43 supra for
the common law rule in trademark law. Furthermore, the mere fact that a court has
imposed a given rule has not prevented Congress from codifying the rule when it
concurs in the wisdom of the rule. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra for an
example of such a situation in the context of copyright law.
45 See J. McCARTHY, supra note 40, § 2.12 for a general discussion of the distin-
guishing characteristics of the two statutes.
4" The holder of a trademark is not given an absolute monopoly in that mark,
but is given the right to prevent the use of similar marks which might cause confusion
in the marketplace. Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). The end to be
achieved is economic, not cultural, and is not in the furtherance of science or the
useful arts. Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). A copyright, on the other hand,
grants to the author a monopoly on the expression of an idea, leaving the idea itself
in the public domain. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918).
'7 See note 98 infra for a discussion of the relationship of copyright law and
trademark law to the policy underlying the first amendment protection of speech.
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b. Patent Law
Patent law is based on the same constitutional grant of
power as is copyright,48 and in the patent area, Congress has
imposed no specific exception for discoveries with an illegal or
immoral purpose.49 Courts nonetheless will deny protection in
such cases.50 At first glance, these decisions would appear to
support the vitality of the Martinetti rule. The means by
which courts find the exception, however, provides a critical
distinction.
The patent statute provides for the protection of "any
new and useful process, machine, or composition matter. ' 51h
The courts' finding of an obscenity defense has been based on
a statutory construction argument that a device is not useful
if its sole function is illegal or immoral.52 Since 1909, the de-
fense in copyright has no such basis in statutory Ianguage.3
The copyright statute, however, does have an analogous limi-
tation in that the work must be original,4 and thus, to the
extent that the bare portrayal of sex is not original, 5 copy-
right protection could not be limited as are patents.
Furthermore, the absence of any treatment of the obscen-
ity defense by Congress may be reasonably construed as a re-
jection of the rule. The doctrine of fair use, an exception to
the protection afforded by the grant of a copyright, was a ju-
dicially imposed doctrine which had no basis in the copyright
statute.56 Congress noted its agreement with the reason un-
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. & See generally 1 A. DELLER, supra note 41, at 72.
40 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
50 See 1 A. DELLER, supra note 41, at 526.
" 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
11 See 1 A. DELLER, supra note 41, at 526.
See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra for a discussion of the basis for the
defense in the language of the statute.
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.01.
56 See note 92 infra for a discussion of the originality requirement as applied to
obscene material.
0 See 1 A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 151-54 for a discussion of the doctrine as it
was developed by the courts. "Fair use" includes quotations from a work in critical
reviews, reproduction by a teacher for educational purposes, quotations in news re-
ports and other such employment of a copyrighted work. See H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-74, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5559,
5678-88, for examples of the "fair use" exception.
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derying that doctrine 7 and specifically provided for it in the
Copyright Act of 1976." A similar example may be found in
the case of patent law."9 Thus, when Congress wanted to in-
clude a judicially created defense in the statute, it has done
so. Because copyright law has undergone two extensive revi-
sions since Martinetti, Congress has had ample opportunity
to incorporate an obscenity defense into the statutory frame-
work if one were desired.
B. Constitutional Limitations
Notwithstanding the dictum found in Martinetti,° there
is little modern support for the theory that the Constitution
prohibits the copyright of work with obscene content."1 The
strict construction placed on the patent and copyright clause
by the Martinetti court, however, finds some support in the
approach taken by the courts construing federal grants of
power during the same period of history-
6 2
7 Id.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
" The patent statutes underwent extensive revision in 1952. Act of July 19, 1952,
ch. 950, 66 Stat. 798 (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976)). Prior statutes
made no provision for a requirement of nonobviousness, but the courts imposed the
requirement for over 100 years. SEN. REP. No. 1979, 82nd CQng., 2d Sess. 62, re-
printed in [1952] US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394, 2399. Congress concurred in the
wisdom of the rule and codified it in the 1952 revision. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
e See note 11 supra for the Martinetti court's constitutional analysis.
61 Professor Nimmer has suggested that the phrase "[tlo promote the progress of
science and useful arts" be read as a preamble, indicative of purpose rather than
limitation. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, at 1-30. He further asserts that the denial of
copyright protection to obscene works is, in the modern view, premised on statutory
rather than constitutional grounds. Id. at 1-31. Accord, A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at
12.
61 See, e.g., Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), (trademark legislation could
not be based on the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, if it did not specifi-
cally exempt intrastate activity).
While the patent and copyright clause has not involved major constitutional is-
sues in the past, there is no sound reason to believe that the construction given other
grants of federal power in modem times would not apply with equal force to its
scope. J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 120
(1978). The commerce clause, U.S. CONsT. art. , § 8, cl. 3, is perhaps the sharpest
example of this construction. The early view required that a particular act be directly
related to interstate commerce to come within the purview of federal power if the
regulated activity was not in the "stream of commerce." See 100 U.S. at 96-97. Com-
pare Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) with United States v. E. C.
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The theory that a particular work must singularly pro-
mote the progress of science to receive protection can no
longer be maintained under the modern approach to constitu-
tional law. Rather, the question should be whether the grant-
ing of protection to a work bears a reasonable relationship to
a constitutionally permitted objective. 3  Congress could
reasonably find that the best way to promote the progress of
the sciences is to protect all works."" Congress also could find
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Since 1937, the Supreme Court has allowed Congress
much greater latitude in determining whether a particular act bears a reasonable reIa-
tionship to the enumerated power on which it is based or whether it is necessary and
proper to the exercise of that power. The Supreme Court modified its view of the
federal commerce power in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937),
beginning the return to the Court's original view of the power as expressed in Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). With the removal of the tenth amend-
ment as a bar to federal exercise of the commerce power, United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941), the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl 18,
regained the efficacy given it by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819). See L. TIME, AmERicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-3
(1978). The modern test is couched in terms of "affecting commerce," a far cry from
the original strict construction. Compare Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) with
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Under this test,
the Court has gone so far as to uphold the federal regulation of a wheat crop which
was completely intrastate, on the premise that the failure so to regulate would affect
interstate commerce. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Professor Tribe refers
to this as the "cumulative effect" principle:
It is now established that Congress has the power to regulate not only acts
which taken alone would have substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce. . . but also acts which might reasonably be deemed nationally
significant in their aggregate economic effect; the triviality of an individual
act's impact is irrelevant so long as the class of such acts might reasonably
be deemed to have substantial national consequences.
L. TRIBE, supra § 5-5 (emphasis in original).
'3 The reason for such a rule is apparent when the history of literature vis-a-vis
obscenity regulation is considered. Copyright is essentially forward-looking in its na-
ture, concerned with the development of learning rather than with the maintenance
of the status quo. Thus, if the present level of development is not to be maintained,
there must be room for creativity that, although not "acceptable" at present, may be
of value to tomorrow's society. For a list of examples of works condemned at one time
but of great current cultural significance, see 604 F.2d at. 857-58.
" 604 F.2d at 860. This was the basis of the Mitchell Brothers court's holding.
The court considered the statutory language conclusive and did not consider the more
difficult question of whether Congress actually made such a determination as to ob-
scene writings. The legislative history does not disclose any such determination, other
than to point out that a work need not have any particular esthetic merit to qualify
for copyright protection. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5664. It is only by implication that Con-
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that the failure to protect obscene works could have a nega-
tive impact on the progress of the sciences.65 Thus, in a mod-
ern context, the Constitution poses no bar to the granting of
copyright protection to the obscene or immoral work.
C. Common Law Basis
It has been suggested that the obscenity defense came to
American jurisprudence from the English common law and
thus exists independently of statutory law. 6 A majority of the
cases denying protection or suggesting that protection would
be denied were the work immoral or obscene appear to have
adopted this approach.6 The Mitchell Brothers court noted
two potential bases for such a rule. 8 The first is the English
rule that no property right exists in a work which is im-
moral, 9 and the second might best be stated, as one court did,
that "[c]ourts of justice will not lend their aid to protect the
authors of immoral works. '70 The latter approach appears to
gress has determined that obscene works of no current literary value should be copy-
righted so as to encourage the development of those with value. See note 39 supra for
a discussion of the significance of this determination inlight of modern obscenity law.
65 604 F.2d at 860. See note 101 infra for a discussion of the probable effect of
the obscenity defense on copyright law.
" Schneider, supra note 1, at 694-96.
67 No case since Martinetti has premised the obscenity defense on statutory con-
struction and only three later cases intimate a constitutional basis for the doctrine.
Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947); Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903); Dane v. M.&H. Co., 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1963). See notes 11 and 14 supra for a general discussion of the bases for the obscen-
ity defense in these cases.
" 604 F.2d at 861. The court also noted the equitable maxim of unclean hands,
treated at note 17 supra.
09 The Mitchell Brothers court dismissed this theory in a paragraph, concluding
that the doctrine had not been accepted ip the United States. 604 F.2d at 861. The
court, by reference, took cognizance of the fact that Massachusetts had recognized
the property theory by way of dictum in Keene v. Kimball, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) &45
(1860). See Schneider, supra note 1, at 697. However, the court apparently did not
consider the implicit recognition of the property theory in Broder v. Zeno Mauvais
Music Co., 88 F. 74 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898). See note 11 supra for a discussion of
Broder. But see Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973) (overruling Broder
by implication).
70 Richardson v. Miller, 20 F. Cas. 722, 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1877) (No. 11,791).
The underlying philosophy appears to be that the court has a duty to protect the
public from (its own?) immorality. Schneider, supra note 1, at 694-96. The Mitchell
Brothers court thought the theory was best described by the court in Shook v. Daly,
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pervade American thought on this issue.71
The precise nature of the obscenity defense is unclear,
but in England it appears to have been based primarily on a
concern for the integrity of the court.7 2 The principle of stare
decisis has given the defense a burdensome impact.7 3 And it is
questionable whether any particular act of Congress has re-
pealed such a common law principle, in that implicit repeal of
the common law is not favored 4 Instead, the demise of the
obscenity defense as it existed at common law is best predi-
cated on the nature of the common law itself and on the
changes in society and legal attitudes since the inception of
the doctrine.
The common law is in essence the legal articulation of
mankind's experience. 75 It is to that extent backward-look-
ing.7 6 The courts have long recognized the need for flexibility
49 How. Pr. 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875), to the effect that "rights of the author are
secondary to the right of the public, to be protected from what is subversive of good
morals." Id. at 368.
71 This view is justified primarily by the failure of any American case expressly
to recognize the property theory in a holding. Additionally, if the statute is given its
plain meaning and the common law rule is viewed to be a limitation thereon, the
property theory would be in direct contradiction with the statute, in that a copyright
is a property interest in the expression of an idea and extends to all works of an
author.
1 In Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 108 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B. 1826), in support of a deci-
sion to deny relief, Chief Justice Abbott stated:
But upon the plainest principles of the common law, founded as it is, where
there are no authorities, upon common sense and justice, this action cannot
be maintained. It would be a disgrace to the common law could a doubt be
entertained upon the subject; but I think that no doubt can be entertained,
and I want no authority for pronouncing such a judicial opinion.
Id. at 66.
13 See generally 20 AM. Jun. 2D Courts § 184 (1965).
74 Associated Trans. v. Pusey, 118 A.2d 362, 364 (Del. 1955); State v. Kollenborn,
304 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Mo. 1957); Smith v. United Properties, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 142,
144-45 (Ohio 1965). Furthermore, an affirmative statutory statement without a nega-
tive does not generally repeal the common law rule. Commonwealth v. Barnett, 245
S.W. 874, 877 (Ky. 1922). See note 31 supra for a discussion of the statute as
amended in 1909. But see note 38 supra for a possible contrary view under the 1976
Act.
A 50. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 1-2 (1881). See also Stone, The Common Law
in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1936).
'6 See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270 (1876) (holding that the Court of
Claims, absent congressional expression, must follow the common law rules of
evidence).
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in the common law, understanding that the public is not
served well by rules of law which restrain the growth and de-
velopment of society." Thus, while stability is encouraged
through the principle of stare decisis, the courts have the in-
herent power to discontinue a rule of law when the logical
support for it has eroded78 or when the rule was wrongly de-
veloped from the start.79 Furthermore, a federally created
right should not be abrogated by the courts through the invo-
cation of a common law rule which has outlived its usefulness
and which is no longer reflective of experience.8 0 To date, only
one federal court of appeals may be said to recognize the ob-
scenity defense,"' and no Supreme Court decision is on point.
The obscenity defense as a common law rule, assuming it to
have been sound once, no longer serves the purpose for which
it is said to exist.82 To continue its application in the light of
current views toward public morality 3 and in the view of the
courts' current role in the establishment of moral standards"
7 Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 371 (1893).
" Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 376-82 (1933).
79 See, e.g., Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974); Faber v.
Creswick, 156 A.2d 252 (N.J. 1959).
80 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138
(1968); Wiederhold v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 368 F. Supp. 1054, 1060 (N.D. Ind.
1974).
"1 The cases recognizing obscenity as a defense in the Fifth Circuit are clearly
overruled by Mitchell Brothers. Cases arising within the Ninth Circuit in accord with
the common law rule appear to be of little value after the decision in Belcher v. Tar-
box, 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973). While the latter case concerned a work which was
fraudulent rather than obscene, the rationale used by the court in reaching the result
should be equally applicable to both areas. This leaves only district court cases within
the Second Circuit, none of which is as recent as Mitchell Brothers or Belcher, up-
holding the common law rule as applied to federal copyright law.
11 See note 86 infra for a general discussion of the reasons for the obscenity
defense.
" Compare note 84 infra stating the older view with text accompanying note 97
infra stating the modern view. See also 604 F.2d at 857-58.
" Since the most recent federal case favorably discussing the obscenity defense,
the treatment of obscenity by the judiciary has undergone significant change. Each of
those cases was decided when obscenity was defined by the English rule, as expressed
in R. v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, that if certain passages had a tendency to
deprave and corrupt the minds of those susceptible to such influences, the work was
obscene. See United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1103-04 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879)
(No. 14,571). The first hint of a role for the first amendment came in United States v.
Harmon, 45 F. 414 (D. Kan. 1891), rev'd on other grounds, 50 F. 921 (C.C.D. Kan.
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is to defy the common sense of the common law.
III. DESRBImITY OF THE OBSCENITY DEFENSE
The remaining question is whether, on a policy basis, ob-
scene content should serve as a bar to copyright protection.""
In the final analysis, such a restriction does more harm than
good, and the absence of the restriction, if anything, would
assist in the control of obscenity in the United States. While
the justification given by courts which have interposed the ob-
scenity defense into copyright law is superficially appealing,"6
once it is recognized that obscenity is different from other
work which lacks literary value the absurdity of the rule be-
comes clear.
For the sake of illustration, a simple model is suggested.
'1892), intimating that the first amendment did not protect speech which was inde-
cent or dangerous to the public. The modern role of the first amendment in obscenity
law is relatively pervasive. See text accompanying note 98 infra for a discussion of
this topic. The modern tests are not well suited to such a common law rule, and this
alone justifies a departure from the obscenity defense.
85 A statute should be construed so as to further the purpose and spirit of con-
gressional intent in its enactment. See White v. United States, 191 U.S. 545, 551
(1903). Further, a common law rule should not be applied if to do so would defeat the
purpose of a legislative enactment. See text accompanying note 80 supra for a discus-
sion of this principle. Thus, if the obscenity defense furthers the purpose of copy-
right, its existence is justified. But if it is contrary to this purpose, the court's imposi-
tion of such a defense is to some extent a dereliction of its constitutional duty. If the
effect of the defense is in question, the decision more appropriately should be left to
the legislature. The legislature's ability to conduct hearings on the subject and to
carefully consider the effects, both economic and cultural, on the public interest is
unmatched by the judiciary and its attendant adversary system.
81 The case law demonstrates that the primary reason for the obscenity defense
is to preserve the integrity of the court, not to further substantive public policy. The
courts have long been aware that the failure to enforce a copyright in the case of an
obscene work increases rather than'decreases the dissemination of obscene materials.
See Rogers, supra note 1, at 392 n.4, 394 nn.6, 9, The district court in Mitchell
Brothers noted the existence of this rationale, but proceeded to declare that "[mlore
compelling in the court's mind is the argument that in refusing copyright protection
the creator would have no guarantee of exclusiveness to his product and the rewards
that flow therefrom and this would thereby tend to inhibit the creation of works
which are obscene." 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 143. This reasoning fails, if for no other
reason than that the decision is not made until the work has been created and dis-
tributed. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 395, 401-02 (1958). The criminal statutes relating to ob-
scenity are more than sufficient discouragement, thus any additional deterrence aris-
ing from the obscenity defense is clearly outweighed by the fact that such a ruling
gives the pirate and all others like him a license to disseminate the obscene material.
COPYRIGHT OF OBSCENITY
The content of various writings may be divided into three ba-
sic categories. The first (Type I) would be those works con-
taining no reference to sex. The second (Type II) would be
materials which contain nothing but a portrayal of various
forms of sexual conduct, true "hard core" pornography. The
third (Type III) would be those writings that contain sexual
subject matter but also express some theme or plot, which in
some cases might itself relate to sex. 7 Of course, the latter
group contains works having a varying degree of sexual satu-
ration, and it is this group that creates the most difficulty.
That the obscenity defense would have no impact on
Type I materials is obvious. Similarly, it is unlikely that the
issue, resolved either way, would have an impact on the prop-
agation of Type II materials.8 The diversity of Type III
materials, however, is immense, and it is on this group that an
impact could be had. At one extreme, a story with an innocu-
ous theme may be told with occasional references to sex that
the author deems necessary to achieve reality."9 Somewhere
near the center of the spectrum a socially sensitive theme
might be expressed with a modest amount of sexual activity
actually portrayed.90 At the other extreme, a work may ex-
- The line between Type H and Type I is drawn at that point where there is
some attempt, however miniscule or transparent, to associate the portrayal of sex
with some theme or plot. This is probably the same point at which originality begins.
The appellant in Mitchell Brothers aptly made this point:
In the memorandum opinion the trial court expressed surprise that there
has not been a plethora of cases re-examining the question of obscenity as a
defense to copy right [sic] infringement actions in view of the recent inun-
dation of works containing references to and explicitly exhibiting sexual ac-
tivities. The short answer to that is, or [sic] course, that persons who are
engaged in the business of promoting pornographic works are not anxious
to seek copyright protection because they would then be identified with the
obscene, criminal matter. Persons engaged in criminal activity are not
noted for their willingness to publicly advertise their identity, and it is only
those persons who believe their works are not criminal in nature who pub-
licly acknowledge the works and seek copyright protection.
Brief for Appellant at 11, 604 F.2d 852. Type II material is characterized by under-
world activity, the business generally being conducted as secretly as possible. See
generally J. KILPATRICK, THE SMUT PEDDLERS (1960).
89 Occasional references to sex can no longer be deemed obscene in the context of
first amendment protection. Compare note 84 supra with text accompanying note 97
infra.
-o See F. LEwIs, LITERATURE, OBSCENITY, AND LAW 208-14 (1976). The primary
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press a sexual theme and make frequent and vivid use of sex-
ual activity in an attempt to express the author's idea.9 ' The
problem becomes one of line drawing. The most logical place
to draw the line is, of course, between Type II and Type III
materials,92 but such a distinction would allow the copyright-
ing of some works that might in some communities be ob-
scene. If the line is to be drawn elsewhere, a standard by
which the court may do so must be ascertained.
First amendment law, unfortunately, does not furnish
this standard. Both the copyright laws and the first amend-
ment serve a similar purpose,94 and thus the standard applied
for one should be equally applicable to the other. 5 In Miller
characteristic of this type of work is that, notwithstanding its depiction of sex, the
work has what may be referred to as serious literary or artistic value.
9 The movie involved in Mitchell Brothers may be a good example of this class
of works, although the idea expressed could be considerably less serious and the work
would remain in Type III. Any attempt to express an idea qualifies, for the means by
which the idea is expressed is immaterial. Thus the line of demarcation between these
works and those referred to in note 90 supra and accompanying. text is no more pre-
cise than is the meaning and application of the term "serious." It is this line which
marks obscenity in the constitutional sense.
" The line between Type H and Type III materials is the most certain and the
most conducive of clear definition. This line requires a determination of originality,
whereas the obscenity defense requires a judicial determination of the meaning of the
term "serious." Implicit in the latter term is the imposition of a value judgment by
the court in any particular case. Consider the words of Justice Holmes in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Litho. Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903): "It would be a dangerous undertaking for
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits," Id. at 251.
As to-,copyright, the "narrow and obvious limit" should be originality. The reasons for
allowing the court to make such a value judgment regarding the content under the
first amendment are not present in the case of copyright. See note 98 infra for a
treatment of the first amendment issue. The courts must find originality in copyright
cases regardless of the morality of content. See 1 M. NIMIMIER, supra note 1, at § 2.01.
The usefulness of this point for drawing the line is illustrated by those cases discuss-
ing the obscenity defense which in fact turned on the lack of originality. See, e.g.,
Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173).
" See 604 F.2d at 858.
See Comment, The First Amendment Exception to Copyright: A Proposed
Test, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1158. See also 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 1, § 1.10.
" Some commentators have argued for a national standard of obscenity in copy-
right cases. See Leverson, Copyright and Obscenity: Towards a National Standard?,
7 PERFORMING ARTs REv. 495 (1977); Comment, Copyright-The Obscenity Defense
in Actions to Protect Copyright, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1037 (1978). But see note 99
infra for a discussion of the problems with such a standard.
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v. California,96 the Supreme Court set out a tripartite test for
obscenity. Thus a work will be beyond the protection of the
first amendment only if it is found that (1) the average per-
son, applying community standards, would find the work,
taken as a whole, to appeal to prurient interests; (2) the work
depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way; and (3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.9 Applying this standard
to the model constructed above, two points immediately be-
come apparent. First, some portion of Type III material would
be considered obscene, 98 and second, a copyright could have
full effect in one area of the country and be invalid in an-
other.9  First amendment guidelines therefore do not provide
" 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
9 Id. at 24-25. See generally F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 96-115, 136-47
(1976).
98 The Constitution itself makes no distinction between speech which has serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value and speech which is of no value. U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The requirement of serious value arises out of a balancing of the
state's interest in regulating obscenity against the first amendment interest in pro-
tecting freedom of speech. Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity,
and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 363-68 (1954). The state has no such
interest in the scope of copyright. Logically then, given the fact that both the first
amendment and copyright law serve to encourage the expression of ideas and the
dissemination of information, copyright should extend to the same point to which
first amendment protection would extend but for the state's interest. Under this anal-
ysis, the only limit would be originality. The existence of an obscenity exception in
the case of trademark law is consistent with the above comparison. See note 43 supra
for a discussion of the exception. Trademark law is somewhat analogous to commer-
cial speech, which receives less protection because of the economic incentive inherent
in such speech. Freidman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979). See also Heller, The End of
the "Commercial Speech" Exception-Good Riddance or More Headaches for the
Court?, 67 Ky. L.J. 927 (1978-79).
9 The argument has been made that the use of community standards will cause
the copyright to be regional in scope, rather than the nationwide protection envi-
sioned by the Constitution. Some make this argument to support a nationwide stan-
dard in the application of the obscenity defense. See Leverson, supra note 95. Others
make the argument to point out the impropriety of an obscenity defense in the first
instance. 604 F.2d at 858. The latter is the better reasoned position in that, even if a
national standard could be formulated, it could not remove the original objection to
the community standards approach, that being the creation of a regional copyright.
The first problem which a court will face in attempting to formulate a national stan-
dard will be to determine whose standard is representative of national morality. That
attitudes differ on this point throughout the states is one of the considerations which
prompted the Supreme Court's move to community standards in the first amendment
cases. Consider the following.
1980-81]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69
sufficient standards for copyright law.
Reasons underlying the obscenity defense themselves il-
lustrate the need for line-drawing in this area. The obscenity
defense is based upon the premise that obscenity will thereby
be discouraged. 100 Assuming this to be true, the lack of a clear
line could have serious effects. If a potential creator cannot
ascertain the point at which a writing exceeds the bounds of
copyright protection, and if the potential monetary reward is
his motivation for creativity, then he will logically stay well
clear of the line.'0 If he does so, society will be injured in that
expression of ideas which are not obscene could be discour-
aged. Such a chilling effect, if it occurred, would be "antitheti-
[O]ur Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably
expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single
formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists .... To re-
quire a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a na-
tional "community standard" would be an exercise in futility.
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amend-
ment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.
413 U.S. at 30, 32 (emphasis in original). The converse reasoning is applicable to
copyright. It is contrary to the purpose of copyright to deny the development of crea-
tive expression to the residents of Las Vegas or New York City merely because the
work's value as found in their eyes is not recognized in Maine or Mississippi. This is
particularly true when the forward-looking nature of copyright is considered. Con-
gress is "[t]o promote the progress of science," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis
added), not lock expression into a particular time and place. The trend has been to
shed the cloak of Victorian prudery, and there is no reason to believe that the trend
will not continue. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 97, at §§ 1.3, 2.1. Thus, if a national
standard is articulable, and if it is to be consistent vth the objective of copyright
law, the standard would need to reflect the most liberal view in the nation. Any origi-
nal work probably would be copyrightable under such a standard. Even if the stan-
dard as formulated above is not co-extensive with originality, it is clear that a major-
ity of courts would be enforcing a copyright to a work which, under community
standards, would be obscene in the forum jurisdiction.
100 See note 86 supra for a discussion of this concept.
101 Such a chilling effect is a possibility whenever a vague or imprecisely defined
line separates the existence from the non-existence of a particular right. This legal
phenomenon serves as the explanation for the Miller holding that an obscenity stat-
ute must define the material prohibited. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 97, § 8.3. Such a
result will occur, however, only when the author is attempting to produce a legitimate
work. For example, those persons who are engaged in the production of pornography
are unlikely to change their conduct in response to requirements of copyright law
when the criminal statutes do not induce such a change. See note 88 supra for a
discussion of the effect of the obscenity defense on pornography.
COPYRIGHT OF OBSCENITY
cal" to the purpose of the copyright laws.102 Furthermore, a
defense of obscenity has little or no effect on the creation or
dissemination of Type II material.10 3 Obscenity has flourished
in the past, and if the defense has any effect it is to encourage
authors to forego any attempt at creativity, settling instead
for Type II categorization.
A more important reason for copyrighting works -deemed
to be obscene is that many factors which may influence a find-
ing of obscenity, such as distribution, are beyond the control
of the author or creator.104 The reason for considering the
means of distribution as a factor in the determination of the
existence of a copyright is difficult to find, particularly when
such considerations are not material to the existence of a
copyright in a non-obscene work.
Moreover, there is no sound reason to believe that public
policy would in any way be contravened by the extension of
copyright to obscene works.1 05 The existence of copyright
would not hinder criminal prosecutions, and a plethora of
anti-obscenity mechanisms already exist in state 06 and fed-
eral' 07 law. These laws, unlike copyright laws, are directed at
101 604 F.2d at 856.
103 See note 88 supra for a discussion of the effect the obscenity defense has on
Type II material.
'" Such factors also include pandering, as well as whether the work is directed at
minors or at a socially deviant group. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 97, §§ 4.1-4.6. The
existence of pandering may be the deciding factor in a close obscenity case. Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Thus, a work which standing alone may not be
obscene may be so classified if distributed in such a way as to constitute "the com-
mercial exploitation of erotica." Id. at 466. Distribution to minors also may alter the
first amendment definition of obscenity. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
If the obscenity defense stands, therefore, a work may be the proper subject of a
copyright when created, but may lose such status because of the means of distribu-
tion, a factor over which the author may or may not have control. Even more impor-
tant, the author may lose his copyright because of the way in which a pirate chooses
to distribute the stolen work. This is illustrated by the facts in Mitchell Bros., where
only the pirate screened the film in Texas, the jurisdiction in which it was deemed
obscene.
105 See note 73 supra for the old English view on this subject.
108 604 F.2d at 862. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 97, at § 10.1-10.2 for a general
discussion of state obscenity statutes as of 1976. See also 10 UNIFORM LAWS ANNO-
TATED, MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (1974).
107 604 F.2d at 862. The federal government has been extremely active in the
regulation of obscenity. Congress has sought to preclude the importation of obscenity
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distribution. Thus, the party charged is more closely con-
nected to the conduct which renders the work obscene. In
short, there is no sound reason to clutter copyright litigation
with defenses which are immaterial to the purpose and foreign
to the spirit" 8 of the law of copyright.
CONCLUSION
Despite the questionable development of and the paucity
of precedent for the obscenity defense to copyright infringe-
ment actions, the defense remained alive and well until the
Fifth Circuit decision in Mitchell Brothers. It is hoped that
that decision'wi#l help bring about the total demise of the ob-
scenity defense. Such a demise is long overdue, for the defense
is a judicially created haven for the wrongdoer which counter-
mands the mandate of Congress, serves no positive purpose,
and encourages rather than discourages the dissemination of
obscene materials. Should other courts adopt the Fifth Cir-
cuit's view, the law of copyright will be rid of a significant but
counterproductive doctrine.
Ronald L. Green
since 1842. Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, 5 Stat. 566, § 28 (1842). The use of mails for
the dissemination also is prohibited. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976). Common carriers may
not be utilized for the transportation of obscenity in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. §
1462 (1976), and the transportation of obscenity in interstate commerce for sale or
distribution is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1976). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1463
(1976); 26 U.S.C. § 5723(d) (1976); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1976). A recent concern over the
use of children in pornography is reflected by the enactment of the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. II
1978).
'0 The 1909 Act was prompted by President Theodore Roosevelt who in 1905
expressed his views to Congress concerning the need for revision of the copyright
laws. "They are imperfect in definition, confused and inconsistent in expression; they
omit provision for many articles which, under modern reproductive processes, are en-
titled to protection; they impose hardships upon the copyright proprietor which are
not essential to the fair protection of the public. . . . " 1909 Report, supra note 28,
at 1 (emphasis added). The same considerations to some extent prompted the 1976
Act. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975) (testimony of John G. Lorenz, acting Libra-
rian of Congress). Is not the obscenity defense as developed by the courts just such a
burden on the modern holder of a federal copyright?
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